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Abstract: Credit rating agencies are frequently criticized for producing sovereign ratings that 
do not accurately reflect the economic and political fundamentals of rated countries. This 
article discusses how the home country of rating agencies could affect rating decisions as a 
result of political economy influences and culture. Using data from nine agencies based in 
six countries, we investigate empirically if there is systematic evidence for a home bias in 
sovereign ratings. Specifically, we use dyadic panel data to test whether, all else being 
equal, agencies assign better ratings to their home countries, as well as to countries 
economically, politically and culturally aligned with them. While most of the variation in 
ratings is explained by the fundamentals of rated countries, our results provide empirical 
support for the existence of a home bias in sovereign ratings. We find that the bias becomes 
more accentuated following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and appears to be driven 
by economic and cultural ties, not geopolitics. 
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“The assessments by Standard & Poor’s appear dictated more by newspaper articles than 
reality and appear to be tainted by political considerations.” 
Italy's Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi after his country was downgraded to “A” in September 
2011 
“If I ever dictated anything, it must have been what S&P had to say about domestic Italian 
economic policy.” 
Italy's Prime Minister Mario Monti after his country was downgraded to “BBB” in January 
2012 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Do credit rating agencies objectively assess the default risk of sovereigns? The economic 
function of rating agencies is to reduce the information gap between potential borrowers and 
lenders and thereby increase the efficiency of financial markets. The accuracy of sovereign 
ratings is crucial for the global economy as rating outcomes affect the borrowing costs of 
states (e.g., Afonso et al. 2012), set de­facto ceilings to corporate ratings (e.g., Borensztein 
et al. 2013) and might trigger financial crises (e.g., Ferri et al. 1999). Ideally, competition and 
concerns over reputation should incentivize agencies to publish accurate and unbiased 
ratings. However, many scholars and policymakers around the world blame credit rating 
agencies for unreliable practices, unfortunate timing and misjudgments. Russia’s president 
Vladimir Putin and Germany’s finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble speak of “abuses” and 
“abusive behavio[u]r,” Turkey’s prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan makes claims of 
“unfair” decisions, and José Manuel Barroso, president of the European commission, directly 
accuses the agencies of a “bias […] when it comes to the evaluation of specific issues of 
Europe.”1 
                                               
1 See media reports by AFP (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jj73UJWw­
IDUL1HU5WqDhvPBfqcA?hl=en; accessed 12 September 2013), The Express Tribune 
(http://tribune.com.pk/story/211912/breaking­the­oligopoly­ratings­agencies­under­attack­amid­debt­
crisis/; accessed 13 June 2013), Today’s Zaman (http://www.todayszaman.com/news­280044­.html; 
accessed 13 June 2013), and BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business­14043293; accessed 
12 September 2013). 
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The common argument behind these accusations of biased ratings is that factors 
other than the economic and political fundamentals of recipient countries influence rating 
outcomes. Many of these concerns about biased sovereign ratings revolve around the role of 
the credit rating agency’s “home country.” We define “home country” as the country where 
the agency’s headquarters is located or, alternatively, as the country of origin of its major 
shareholders. Accordingly, we refer to a “home bias” in sovereign ratings if a rating agency 
gives preferential treatment to its home country and to countries with close economic, 
political and cultural ties to it. Thus, in our definition a home bias is a deviation of the actual 
rating level from what would be predicted solely by the sovereign’s economic and political 
fundamentals. Our line of reasoning builds on and adds to the literature on a home bias in 
investment decisions, bank lending behavior, and trade (e.g., French and Poterba 1991; 
McCallum 1995; Tesar and Werner 1995; Wolf 2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001). 
A simple comparison of the sovereign ratings issued by the China­based and 
Chinese­owned agency Dagong and the big three U.S.­based agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s) serves as an illustrative example why ratings might be perceived as 
influenced by the agency’s home country. On the one hand, Dagong assigns higher ratings 
to the Chinese territories Hong Kong and Macao as well as to the group of BRIC countries, 
including China itself. On the other hand, Dagong assigns lower ratings to many Western 
economies than the big three U.S.­based agencies.2 The existing literature does not explain 
these stark differences across agencies. Up until now, scholarship has largely explained 
sovereign ratings by economic and political characteristics of rated countries (e.g., Cantor 
and Packer 1996; Archer et al. 2007; Hill et al. 2010; Biglaiser and Staats 2012). However, 
systematic research on the role of the home country of credit rating agencies in rating 
decisions is still lacking – despite the increased attention this topic has received in debates 
following the Global Financial Crisis. Our article fills this gap in the literature. 
 Why would a rating agency’s home country matter for sovereign ratings? We identify 
steps in the rating process where political economy influences and culture could affect rating 
decisions. Specifically, the rating process might be subject to political pressure, the 
“lobbying” activities of private actors and the self­interests of agency staff. Moreover, cultural 
                                               
2
 Note that Dagong and S&P provide both an “AAA” rating to Hong Kong. Comparison as of June 28, 
2013. Data from Bloomberg and Fitch. 
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distance between the home country of the agency and the rated country could affect ratings 
as well. For example, the economic situation of a country that is culturally closer to the home 
country of the rating agency might appear more positive to analysts than an objective 
assessment would justify. Thus, our work also contributes to the literature on the effect of 
cultural biases (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Guiso et al. 2006, 2009; Giannetti and Yafeh 
2012). 
Is there systematic empirical evidence of a home bias in sovereign ratings? We 
examine whether the home country's economic and geopolitical interests in rated countries 
as well as cultural distance to rated countries are related to rating outcomes. For this 
purpose, we use monthly dyadic panel data on sovereign ratings issued by nine rating 
agencies based in six countries between January 1990 and June 2013. The data have been 
obtained directly from the rating agencies or accessed via Bloomberg and cover up to 143 
sovereigns. Specifically, we test whether, conditional on the economic and political 
fundamentals of rated countries, credit rating agencies assign better ratings to their home 
country as well as to countries that are geopolitically and economically aligned with, or 
culturally similar to it. Our results show empirical evidence of a home bias in sovereign 
ratings, which becomes more pronounced following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis 
in September 2008. The extent to and the areas in which agencies are prone to a home bias 
differ across agencies. Specifically, we find that four agencies provide significantly better 
ratings to their home country than what would be justified by their assessments of the 
economic and political fundamentals of other sovereigns. Moreover, five agencies assign 
significantly better ratings to those countries to which home­country banks have a higher 
relative risk exposure, and six agencies are to some degree affected by cultural distance as 
measured by linguistic differences and common language. Overall, the home bias in 
sovereign ratings appears to be driven by economic and cultural ties, not geopolitics. 
 The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the credit rating agencies 
and compare their key characteristics. Section 3 summarizes the existing literature on 
sovereign ratings and highlights the gaps in the literature that this article addresses. In 
Section 4, we discuss the mechanisms that could lead to a home bias in sovereign ratings 
and present our hypotheses. Section 5 introduces the data and econometric methods. In 
Section 6, we put our hypotheses to an empirical test and present our results. Finally, 
Section 7 summarizes, concludes, and outlines policy implications.  
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2. THE AGENCIES 
Credit rating agencies are private companies that assess the default risk of bonds of all 
types. There are about 150 agencies operating in the rating business worldwide (White 
2010; De Haan and Amtenbrink 2011). Of these, most agencies are active in a narrow 
national or regional market and focus solely on corporate ratings. Only a small number of 
agencies issue sovereign ratings. We were able to identify nine agencies that provide 
sovereign ratings for at least 25 sovereigns: Capital Intelligence (CI), Dagong Global, 
Dominion Bond Rating Services (DBRS), Feri EuroRating Services, Fitch Ratings, Japan 
Credit Rating Agency (JCR), Moody's Investors Service, Rating and Investment Information 
(R&I), and Standard & Poor's (S&P).3 These nine agencies are based in six countries. 
Sovereign ratings, often used synonymously with the terms “sovereign credit ratings,” 
“sovereign debt ratings,” or “sovereign risk ratings,” are assessments of a country’s 
creditworthiness. CI, for example, defines sovereign credit ratings as an indicator of “the 
ability and willingness of sovereign governments to repay existing and future commercial 
debt obligations on time and in full.”4 The rating scales follow letter designations and differ 
only marginally in terms of notation across agencies (see Online Appendix A1 for details). 
The best rating issued by most agencies is the grade “AAA,” which is assigned to sovereigns 
with the lowest probability of default. As of June 2013, Switzerland, Finland, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg and Norway are the only sovereigns that receive the top rating by all agencies 
that assign a rating to them. Ratings of “BB” or lower are usually considered to be of “junk 
status,” i.e., to have a high expectation of default. 
 Table 1 provides an overview of the nine agencies covered in our study. While the 
corporate history of S&P dates back to 1860, the smaller agencies are relatively new actors 
in the rating business. DBRS is the oldest of the small agencies, having been active since 
                                               
3 The U.S.­based agency Egan-Jones Ratings Company provides ratings for 19 sovereigns only (see 
http://www.egan­jones.com/; accessed 24 September 2013). Moreover, there is a number of rating 
agencies that provide ratings for a very limited set of countries. For example, the Ukrainian rating 
agency Credit-Rating issues sovereign ratings for member countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (see http://www.credit­rating.ua; accessed 17 September 2013). 
4
 See CI’s company website available at http://www.ciratings.com/page/rating­
methodologies/sovereign­ratings (accessed 18 October 2013). 
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1976. Most of the smaller agencies have started to rate sovereigns in the late 1990s since 
the demand for these ratings increased strongly when a larger number of countries started to 
issue sovereign bonds. The nine agencies under analysis show huge variation with regard to 
their size. The three large U.S.­based agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and – to a 
lesser extent – Fitch, are the dominant players in the global rating market. They have several 
thousand employees each, of which more than a thousand are concerned with ratings 
(White 2010). All three are not only physically present in their home country, but possess 
between 24 and 34 offices in other countries, and employ numerous foreign analysts as well. 
The other six agencies employ a much smaller number of people, and only possess between 
one (JCR) and five (Feri) foreign offices. Nevertheless, the interest in these smaller agencies 
is increasing – not only in the financial sector. Downgrades by Dagong in particular receive a 
lot of media attention.5 
 The agencies differ considerably with regard to their ownership structure. Banks and 
financial institutions are among the most important shareholders of most credit rating 
agencies. Feri, Moody's, S&P’s mother company McGraw Hill, JCR and R&I all have one or 
more financial institutions among their major shareholders. For example, the Vanguard 
Group, the Bank of New York Mellon Corp. and BlackRock Inc. are shareholders of both 
Moody’s and S&P. The vertical and horizontal cross holdings have led to concerns about the 
influence of banks as shareholders if they are also invested in rated securities.6 Dagong and 
DBRS are owned by private individuals. Not much information is publicly available about the 
Canadian businessman Walter Schroeder who owns DBRS. Dagong owner Guan Jianzhong 
                                               
5 See, for example, articles on the websites of The Economist 
(http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2011/08/debt­ceiling­crisis­1; accessed 13 November 
2013), the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/10/17/chinas­dagong­takes­aim­
at­u­s/?KEYWORDS=dagong; accessed 13 November 2013) and CNN 
(http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/08/02/china.us.rating/; accessed 13 November 2013) 
6 The European Commission speaks of “shareholders that sometimes overlap” and “risk of conflicts of 
interest that could affect the quality of rating.” Their new rules specifically “require CRAs to disclose 
publicly if a shareholder with 5% or more of the capital or voting rights holds 5% or more of a rated 
entity” and “prohibit ownership of 5% or more of the capital or the voting rights in more than one 
CRA.” (see European Commission MEMO/13/13 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press­
release_MEMO­13­13_en.htm, accessed 11 December 2013). 
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previously worked for the Chinese government, but publicly emphasizes the independence 
of his agency despite the generally strong government influence on the economy in China.  
In two cases, the home country as determined by the agency’s headquarters is not 
identical to the home country as defined based on the citizenship of the agency’s major 
shareholders. While the U.S.­based agency Fitch belonged to 100 percent to the French 
holding company Fimalac until 2006 (which still holds 50 percent of the shares), Cyprus­
based CI is owned by three private individuals with Arabic names and a privately­owned 
Kuwait­based company. 
 Finally, there are huge discrepancies with respect to the country coverage of the 
rating agencies. While S&P has the widest coverage with 125 countries (and territories), 
DBRS covers the least (25). Appendix 1 shows a world map for each rating agency that 
graphically displays the respective sovereign ratings assigned to each country as of June 
2013. As can be seen, there are not only substantial differences with respect to the set of 
countries covered, but also striking differences with respect to the ratings assigned. For 
example, the US agencies Moody’s and Fitch rate the United States with the top­notch 
“AAA,” while Chinese Dagong assigns an “A” only, i.e., five points lower. Table 2 compares 
the (average) rating assigned to each home country by its respective home agencies to the 
average rating received from all other agencies. As of June 2013, six out of eight home 
countries receive a better rating from their home agencies. Does the literature provide an 
explanation why these differences in rating assignments exist across rating agencies? This 
is what we turn to next. 
 
3. WHAT THE PREVIOUS LITERATURE EXAMINES 
The importance of sovereign rating decisions has risen over the last decades. In today’s 
globalized economy, sovereign ratings exert considerable influence on both economic and 
political outcomes. Evidently, they have an impact on sovereign debt yields and thus a 
government’s ability to borrow from international capital markets (e.g., Cantor and Packer 
1996). There is also empirical evidence that concludes that downgrades have negative 
repercussions on market returns, the domestic stock market and the dollar value of the 
currency of the rated country (Brooks et al. 2004). Other studies have found that changes in 
sovereign ratings also affect corporate ratings (Borensztein et al. 2013; Durbin and Ng 2005) 
and inflows of portfolio investments in the same direction (Biglaiser et al. 2008). Moreover, 
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credit rating agencies are blamed for contributing to the instability of financial markets and 
for having aggravated financial crises (e.g., Ferri et al. 1999; Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002; 
White 2010). Therefore, it is not surprising that the study of the determinants of sovereign 
ratings has received a lot of attention in the literature. 
 Early work by Cantor and Packer (1996) investigates the determinants of rating 
assignments by the US agencies Moody’s and S&P. They find that both agencies share the 
same rating criteria but put different weights on individual factors. Similarly, Hill et al. (2010) 
find significant differences in the weights that Fitch, Moody’s and S&P assign to the various 
factors that determine sovereign ratings. By comparing the relevant factors, they identify six 
variables that are used as common determinants of sovereign ratings: GDP per capita, GDP 
growth and its square, past default experience, country risk rating, and risk premiums. 
Other recent studies have focused on political factors as determinants of sovereign 
ratings. Starting with Archer et al. (2007), one strand of the literature examines a potential 
“democratic advantage” in sovereign ratings. While Archer et al. (2007) do not find empirical 
support for the suggested positive link between ratings and democratic institutions, Beaulieu 
et al. (2012) come to the opposite conclusion when they account for the fact that democratic 
countries are more likely to have access to the international capital markets. Disentangling 
electoral democracy and political constraints, Cordes (2012) shows that the existence of 
contested elections does not matter for rating outcomes, but countries that impose more 
political constraints on the executive do receive better ratings. Along similar lines, Biglaiser 
and Staats (2012) find that countries’ rule of law, judicial independence and protection of 
property rights all improve a country’s rating outcome. Overall, political factors have been 
shown to play an important, though smaller, role compared to economic fundamentals 
(Haque et al. 1998; Archer et al. 2007). Among the political factors that seem to be 
considered in agencies’ rating decisions are political business cycles (Block and Vaaler 
2004; Vaaler et al. 2006; Biglaiser and Staats 2012) and executive party tenure (Archer et al. 
2007).  
 The findings of the previous literature have two important caveats. First, most of the 
literature analyzes only sovereign ratings made by the big three U.S.­based agencies. There 
are just a few exceptions. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010) compare rating decisions by 
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Japanese agencies to those of the US agencies. Bartels and Weder di Mauro (2013) come 
to the surprising conclusion that the ratings assigned by Germany­based Feri to European 
countries are “tougher” than those issued by its US competitors.7 To the best of our 
knowledge, no empirical study so far has looked at a broad set of rating agencies to analyze 
the determinants of sovereign ratings. Second, the previous literature does not explain the 
marked differences in rating assignments between agencies. The literature so far explained 
sovereign ratings   issued by a rating agency   based in home country   only with 
characteristics of the rated country   at time  : 
  , , ,  =     ,  ,   ,     (1) 
where   stands for the economic fundamentals and   for the political fundamentals of the 
rated country. This approach ignores the potential role played by the location of the agency’s 
headquarters and the nationality of its main shareholders. We aim to fill this gap. 
 
4. WHY THE HOME COUNTRY COULD MATTER 
Consider Japan. The US­based agencies Fitch, Moody’s and S&P all assign ratings of “AA­“ 
or lower to the country plagued by demographic problems, deflation and economic 
stagnation. German Feri had assigned an “AA” rating until it also downgraded Japan’s 
sovereign debt to “AA­” in June 2013. The ratings of Japan issued by Dagong are even 
lower than those issued by its Western counterparts. The Chinese agency downgraded the 
country’s debt to “A” in March 2013. On the other side of the spectrum, the Japanese 
agencies are significantly more optimistic about their home country. Since Japan Credit 
Ratings (JCR) entered the rating business, it has continuously assigned an “AAA” rating to 
Japan. Although JCR’s Japanese competitor Rating and Investment (R&I) downgraded its 
home country in December 2011, it still assigns the second highest rating “AA+.” 
                                               
7
 With respect to China, some papers analyze corporate ratings from Chinese agencies (e.g., 
Kennedy 2008), but we are not aware of a systematic empirical study on Dagong’s sovereign ratings. 
See also Shin and Moore (2003) for a study of the differences in corporate ratings from Japanese and 
US agencies. 
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This case serves as an illustrative example why many observers perceive agencies 
to be influenced by their country of origin. In this article, we refer to a home bias if a 
sovereign rating deviates from what would be justified by a sovereign’s economic and 
political fundamentals in favor of the home country (or countries aligned with it). There are 
two potential sources of a home bias. First, political economy influences on the rating 
process could bias rating decisions in a way that favors the home country’s economic and 
geopolitical interests. Governments and lobby groups might put pressure on rating agencies 
in order to advance the economic and geopolitical interests of the home country, leading to a 
preferential treatment of certain countries. Second, sovereigns that are more culturally 
similar to the home country could receive a favorable treatment. Extending equation (1) from 
above, we hypothesize that home­sovereign pair­specific variables   , ,  explain sovereign 
ratings in addition to the characteristics specific to country  : 
  , , ,  =     , ,  ,   ,  ,   ,     (2) 
 If the home country of a rating agency matters for rating outcomes, which steps in the 
rating process could be subject to such biases? To answer this question, we need a 
thorough understanding of the process that leads to the assignment of a sovereign rating. 
For the most part, all agencies follow similar procedures to determine their ratings. Figure 1 
groups the usual process that leads to a rating assignment into four phases. In the first 
phase, Rating Initiation, the agency enters into an official agreement with the sovereign (in 
case of a solicited rating), assigns analysts to that particular sovereign and collects data. In 
the second phase, which we refer to as Due Diligence, the agency gathers further 
information by collaborating with the sovereign, which are subsequently analyzed. In the 
third phase, Rating Assignment, the analysts draft a preliminary report for the rating 
committee, which has the final say on the decision. The committee consists of several 
analysts, augmented with at least one senior director with managerial authority, who serves 
as chairperson. After the committee’s decision, the sovereign gets notified and has the 
opportunity to appeal. In the final phase, Rating Publication, the agency publishes the final 
report and the corresponding rating and continuously monitors the sovereign's economic and 
political situation. 
 There are several important differences in the rating process between the nine 
agencies under analysis (see Appendix 2 for details). First, the number of analysts that are 
assigned to assess the creditworthiness of a sovereign varies considerably across agencies. 
While most agencies assign only one (CI, DRBS, and Moody’s) or two (Fitch, JCR, and 
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S&P) analysts to each sovereign, Dagong and R&I claim to use a whole team of analysts. 
Second, most agencies (e.g., Fitch, S&P) conduct several interviews with representatives of 
the sovereign, which usually involve personal meetings at relevant ministries and central 
banks, while others do not (CI, Dagong, and Feri). Third, R&I is the only agency that does 
not provide the sovereign with the opportunity to pursue a rating appeal after being notified 
about the final rating decision. Most agencies approve such a request if the sovereign 
provides new or additional information that the agencies consider relevant. The fourth 
obvious difference concerns the surveillance of the credit rating. While some agencies follow 
a fixed update interval, others provide ongoing surveillance (e.g., S&P).8 The knowledge 
about the rating process allows us to derive how economic interests, geopolitical alignment 
and cultural proximity could influence rating decisions. 
 
4.1 Economic and Geopolitical Interests of the Home Country 
Political economy influences to advance the home country’s economic and geopolitical 
interests are more likely to occur during the later stages of the rating process. The rating 
committee plays a decisive role as the usual rating process gives discretion to the members 
of this committee. While the initial rating proposal (“sovereign indicative rating level”) 
generally results from a quantitative model made by analysts, the composition of the rating 
committee leaves room for a senior director to overturn an “objective” rating proposal. S&P, 
for example, speaks of “exceptional adjustment factors” (S&P 2012). Lobbying the 
chairperson of the rating committee should be most attractive as she possesses the highest 
leverage. The possibility of sovereigns to appeal after the initial rating decision gives further 
leeway for interested parties to influence rating outcomes. 
 Governments have strong reasons to try to sway rating decisions. First, sovereign 
ratings determine the extent of access to international capital markets, in particular for 
emerging and developing economies (Reinhart 2002). Second, even for industrialized 
economies with well­established market access, rating downgrades can influence a 
                                               
8
 The update intervals range between a monthly frequency (e.g., JCR) to an annual frequency (e.g., 
Fitch). 
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sovereign’s borrowing costs (Afonso et al. 2012). In particular, certain institutional investors 
are bound by their own charter or law to choose only assets above a certain critical rating 
threshold (“hardwiring of ratings”).9 For a sovereign, falling below this threshold would lead 
to a sudden drop in bond demand and consequently an increase in bond yields. Third, rating 
decisions can also be interpreted as a signal of leader performance. Despite the widespread 
public skepticism towards the agencies, repeated downgrades can severely damage the 
reputation of a government. For example, the downgrades of France in 2012 and 2013 cast 
doubts over the optimistic predictions of President François Hollande’s government 
concerning the future development of the French economy. According to the media, the 
downgrade by S&P constitutes “politically a heavy blow for the head of state.”10 Fourth, 
governments might also be interested in ratings of countries to which they have strong 
economic ties. Downgrades and potentially resulting instabilities may harm the home 
country’s export interests and endanger the investments of domestic agents. Home­country 
governments may also have an interest in the stability of geopolitically aligned countries, i.e., 
countries with which they collaborate in international fora or that are of military importance.11 
Although governments have these motives to influence rating decisions, it is less 
obvious that they have also the political power to influence assessments provided by 
privately­owned credit rating agencies. With respect to international financial organizations, it 
is much more straightforward that political economy factors can affect economic 
                                               
9 In the U.S., for example, references to credit ratings are contained in several investment company 
act rules and forms, e.g., the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) Release No. 9193, Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) Release No. 29592 (Mar. 3, 2011), 76 FR 12896 
(Mar. 8, 2011). The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) forbids money market funds to 
purchase securities that are not rated by any two Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSRO) in one of the two highest rating categories. The U.S. Department of Labor 
restricts pension fund investments to securities rated “A” or higher (Rule 2a­7 [10] of the Investment 
Company Act). Section 939A of the Dodd­Frank Act recognizes this reliance as a potential problem 
and requires federal agencies to review their regulations. 
10
 See an article by France’ leading financial newspaper, Les Échos, available at 
http://www.lesechos.fr/economie­politique/politique/actu/0203115388893­degradation­de­la­note­de­
la­france­un­nouveau­coup­dur­pour­l­executif­627380.php (accessed 30 November 2011, own 
translation of the quote). 
11
 In this regard, DiGiuseppe et al. (2012) show that countries with affordable credit access have a 
lower probability to experience civil conflict. 
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assessments since governments are direct shareholders of these institutions (e.g., Dreher et 
al. 2008; Fratzscher and Reynaud 2011). However, there is a questionable dependence of 
agencies on governments, in particular their home government. Only the ratings of officially 
recognized agencies can be used by companies to determine their capital requirements in 
the European Union and the United States (White 2010; De Haan and Amtenbrink 2011). 
Since corporate ratings in their respective home countries are a major source of income, the 
prospect of losing that recognition is an imminent threat to agencies. Dagong, for example, 
was denied recognition as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) 
in the United States in September 2010. 
There is also anecdotal evidence that governments try to use their influence to 
impact rating decisions. Two weeks after the U.S.­based rating agency Egan­Jones 
downgraded the United States to “AA,” the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) brought administrative action against the firm for alleged “material misstatements” 
during its application for regulatory approval in 2008. In this context, the owner of Egan­
Jones Sean Egan stated that "[w]e are not going to be intimidated by anybody from issuing 
timely, accurate ratings.”12 In a similar case, S&P called a $5 billion lawsuit against the 
company “a retaliation for its 2011 decision to strip the country of its AAA credit rating.”13 
More directly, government ties are also visible for Chinese Dagong, as the rating agency 
entertains strong relations with several Chinese government institutions (see Ling 2012 for a 
discussion). 
 Beyond direct pressure from governments, other interested parties within an 
agency’s home country could influence rating outcomes. First, since many banks and 
financial institutions are among the major shareholders of rating agencies, they could have 
the leverage to directly or indirectly exert an influence on the agencies’ decision­making to 
protect the value of their bond holdings. According to Shin and Moore (2003), there are 
indications that the Japanese rating agencies are more vulnerable to influence by its 
                                               
12
 See, for example, an article on the website of The Wall Street Journal available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303513404577354023825841812 (accessed 
18 November 2013). 
13
 See, for example, an article by Reuters available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/us­
mcgrawhill­sandp­lawsuit­idUSBRE98210L20130903 (accessed 15 December 2013). 
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shareholders than the US agencies. They cite a report by the Japan Center for International 
Finance, according to which “[t]he composition of the shareholders of rating agencies may 
impair the impartiality of ratings” (Shin and Moore 2003: 331). Shareholders might try to 
obtain a preferential treatment of countries where they are exposed to large risks, e.g., 
where they have a large amount of outstanding loans. Second, agency staff or persons close 
to them may have a personal monetary investment in the respective country under 
assessment. A home bias might arise because these actors, like other investors, are more 
likely to hold larger stakes in the domestic economy or economies with close ties than 
somewhere else (e.g., French and Poterba 1991; Tesar and Werner 1995). Third, analysts 
at rating agencies might be influenced by future career concerns; the prospect of a new job 
in the banking sector, easily possible because of similar job requirements, might seem 
attractive. In this context, Bar­Isaac and Shapiro (2011: 120) speak of a “revolving door” that 
connects rating agencies and investment banks. 
 Finally, beyond political economy influences, national sentiments of agency staff may 
be a driver of such a behavior. Morse and Shive (2011) provide evidence that patriotism 
explains (parts of) the home bias in equity. Similar to “patriotic investors,” employees of 
rating agencies might be reluctant to downgrade the home country or another sovereign 
either because they believe that this decision could have a detrimental impact on their home 
country or just because they are – in the words of Morse and Shive (2011: 411) – “blinded by 
patriotic loyalty.” This effect should be even more pronounced in agencies where national 
sentiments are anchored in the corporate culture. Ling (2012) describes the Chinese agency 
Dagong as a “patriotic rating agency.” Ling refers to the company’s website which states that 
the agency aims to promote the patriotism of its employees. Taken together, there are 
theoretical arguments that would support the hypothesis that economic ties and geopolitical 
interests influence rating outcomes. 
 
4.2 The Role of Cultural Distance 
Various studies discuss the role of cultural distance in financial decision­making. Guiso et al. 
(2009: 1095) identify “perceptions rooted in culture” as important determinants of bilateral 
investments. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001: 1072) hypothesize that “familiarity­related 
effects could be the major contributor to home bias.” Indeed, their empirical analysis shows 
that culture influences stockholdings of both private and corporate investors. Empirical 
evidence also suggests that firms favor culturally closer overseas listing venues (Sarkissian 
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and Schill 2004). With respect to syndicated bank loans, Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) show 
that lenders treat borrowers from countries that are culturally more distant as less reliable. 
They receive smaller loans, pay higher interest rates and are more often required to provide 
a third­party guarantee. Given this evidence, it would not be surprising if cultural distance 
also affects decision­making at rating agencies. 
 Why would agencies assign better ratings to culturally closer and thus more familiar 
countries? To answer this question, it is important to remember that rating agencies have to 
base their assessments on limited and incomplete information. They acquire this information 
either from publicly available sources or from the sovereign directly (“Due Diligence”). The 
agencies have to cope with concerns regarding the reliability and accuracy of these data. 
We discuss three lines of reasoning why cultural proximity (familiarity) might affect rating 
decisions. These are based on information, differences in risk perceptions, and taste­based 
discrimination. 
First, an information­based theory of cultural distance would assume that a home 
bias can be the result of completely rational behavior.14 Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) argue 
that banks collect less information about culturally more distant borrowers due to higher 
costs of information gathering and thus consider them as riskier. Similarly, the rating 
agencies face a trade­off between the benefit of acquiring additional information and the 
transaction costs this would incur. Linguistic differences raise transaction costs by increasing 
the difficulties of direct communication and the ease of translation (see also Melitz 2008). 
This can cause agencies to collect less information overall. Less information can then 
translate into lower ratings since predictions of the sovereign’s liquidity to serve its debts are 
less precise and thus imply a higher probability of defaulting.15 Due to this information­cost 
trade­off, it could be rational that agencies give lower ratings to less familiar countries. 
                                               
14
 See Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) for a similar argument. 
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 Assume that a rating agency estimates the liquidity   of two sovereigns  , with  [  ]~ ( ,   
 )	. A 
sovereign enters a state of default if    < 	 . Thus, the probability of default is  (   < 	 ) = 	   
|   |
  
 . 
Assume that two sovereigns   and   have the same expected value  , but sovereign   is culturally 
more distant to the home country of the rating agency. As a result of higher transaction costs, the 
agency collects less information about sovereign  , which implies that its prediction of    is less 
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The second explanation for the role of cultural distance focuses on differences in risk 
perceptions, in particular with regard to relative optimism and trust. Following the literature 
on an “optimism bias,” a home bias does not require that the actors actually possess more 
information; it suffices that the actors perceive the information differently. Kilka and Weber 
(2000) find that that people hold more “optimistic” expectations of domestic investments as 
they feel more “competent” about investment possibilities at home.16 Similarly, French and 
Poterba (1991) explain the home bias in portfolio holdings with domestic investors’ more 
optimistic expectations about domestic stock returns compared to foreign stocks. The 
existing literature suggests that trust rooted in culture is a potential cause of these 
differences in perceptions. DeBruine (2002) provides experimental evidence that people 
have higher trust in people who look more similar. Guiso et al. (2009) find that cultural 
distance translates into lower levels of bilateral trust, which then translates into less 
economic exchange between countries. They conclude from their analysis of bilateral 
investments that “cultural effects are not limited to unsophisticated consumers, but are also 
present among sophisticated professionals” (p. 1098). 
In the rating process, trust between the agency’s home country and the rated country 
could influence risk perceptions of the agency staff and thus lead to an “optimism bias.” For 
example, analysts could perceive the same economic information from a more familiar 
source as more reliable and its bonds as less risky. Beyond that, bilateral trust might not only 
matter for how analysts perceive the available information about the sovereign’s ability to 
pay, it could also affect beliefs about a sovereign’s willingness to pay its debt. This is 
important since countries commonly default on their debt for reasons other than insufficient 
liquidity (see historic evidence in Tomz and Wright 2007; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). A 
government may decide to default for opportunistic reasons if the domestic political costs to 
                                                                                                                                                  
precise compared to that of   , i.e.,   
 >  
 . Thus,     
|   |
  
  >    	 
|   |
  
 	 for all   < 	 , i.e., the 
predicted default probability is higher for the culturally more distant sovereign. A similar argument is 
made by Gehrig (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1997), who show noisy rational expectations models 
that explain a home bias in international equity investments under the assumption that domestic 
investors have more precise information than foreign investors. 
16 For related evidence of an “optimism bias,” see Shiller et al. (1996) for a comparison between the 
stock market expectations of Japanese and American investors, and Strong and Xu (2003) for fund 
managers’ views on prospects of international equity markets. 
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the government of raising funds weigh higher than those caused by a default. With this in 
mind, it seems plausible that rating analysts evaluate a government’s willingness to pay 
more optimistically if the level of bilateral trust is higher. Taken together, as cultural proximity 
relates to relative optimism and trust, it could also lead to better ratings of culturally closer 
countries. 
 A third potential reason for the role of cultural distance is direct discrimination of 
certain ethnicities or races. Building on Becker (1961) and Stiglitz (1973), we define 
discrimination in our context as behavior that treats two sovereigns with the same economic 
characteristics differently based on ethnic or racial differences. Taste­based discrimination 
may negatively influence how credible borrowers are perceived to be (Giannetti and Yafeh 
2012). Ravina (2008) provides empirical evidence that race affects credit conditions. Rating 
agency staff may exhibit similar behavior. 
 Summarizing the theoretical arguments about potential political economy influences 
and the role of culture in rating decisions, our hypothesis reads as follows: 
Hypothesis: Controlling for economic and political fundamentals of rated countries, a rating 
agency assigns a better rating to 
 (1) its home country. 
 (2) countries in which the home country has larger economic interests. 
 (3) countries geopolitically aligned with its home country. 
 (4) countries that are culturally closer to its home country. 
 
5. DATA 
5.1 Dependent Variable: Sovereign Ratings 
Our dependent variable is a country’s sovereign rating provided by one of nine rating 
agencies: CI, Dagong, DBRS, Feri, Fitch, JCR, Moody’s, R&I, and S&P (see again Table 1 
for an overview). We follow the literature and examine the determinants of a sovereign’s 
long­term foreign­currency rating, i.e., ratings for government bonds that are issued in a 
foreign currency and have a maturity of more than one year. We retrieve daily information on 
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sovereign ratings by most agencies via Bloomberg.17 The information on ratings published 
by Feri and Fitch is obtained directly from the agencies. We take the monthly average of the 
assigned ratings since some agencies only review their ratings on a monthly basis (see 
again Appendix 2). Moreover, the highest frequency for which the explanatory variables are 
available is also monthly.18 
 For our empirical analysis, all ratings have been translated to a 21­point scale in 
accordance with the literature (see Hill et al. 2010 for a similar approach). This means that 
we assign the highest value of 21 to an “AAA” rating. “C” and “D” in turn are translated into a 
value of one.19 The pair­wise correlation between sovereign ratings from the nine credit 
rating agencies under analysis ranges between 0.784 (CI­Feri) and 0.987 (Fitch­S&P).20 
 
5.2 Control Variables 
To be able to test for a home bias in sovereign ratings, we need to control for those country­
specific economic and political factors that should “objectively” determine the ability of a 
country to repay its debt. In order to do so, we build on the sets of variables employed in 
Archer et al. (2007) and Hill et al. (2010).21 For comparison, Appendix 3 lists all factors that 
                                               
17 To access the data on sovereign ratings, log on to a Bloomberg terminal and type “CSDR.” The 
variables selected are Foreign Long Term for CI, FC LT Sovereign Ratings for Dagong, Foreign 
Currency LT Debt for DBRS, JCR, Moody’s and S&P, and Foreign Curr Issuer Rtg for R&I. We follow 
Bloomberg and collect Moody's foreign currency issuer rating if Moody's has not assigned a foreign­
currency debt rating to a country. We have downloaded data in late September 2012 and updated all 
information on 28 June 2013. Two obvious mistakes in the R&I data have been corrected after e­mail 
correspondence with the agency’s chief analyst. 
18 When a rating is withdrawn in the course of a month, we still compute the average rating based on 
the available information. 
19
 As there are slight differences in the rating scale across rating agencies, please refer to Online 
Appendix A1 for a full translation table. 
20 See Online Appendix A3 for details. 
21 In contrast to Archer et al. (2007), we do not include variables that measure executive party tenure 
and undivided government since these variables contain too many missing values and would thus 
substantially reduce our sample size (data from Beck et al. 2001). 
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the nine agencies communicate in official documents as those they would account for in their 
rating process. Most of the officially communicated factors show a significant overlap across 
agencies. Comparing these factors with those employed in the literature, we identify a 
potential lack of control for conflict risks, which is why we add further variables in this 
category. Overall, we employ control variables in the following four categories. 
 Domestic Economic Performance. To capture the sovereign’s macroeconomic 
situation, we employ the country’s logged GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US dollars), 
GDP growth rate (including a squared term) and inflation rate (based on consumer prices). 
Following Archer et al. (2007) and Biglaiser and Staats (2012), we also control for the 
sovereign’s richness in natural resources. Natural resources measures total natural resource 
rents as a percentage of GDP. Logged population size is added as a control variable since 
larger countries possess on average a more diversified economy and are thus less affected 
by external shocks. All data are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators.22 
 Financial Stability and Fiscal Performance. To account for a sovereign’s fiscal 
performance, we control for a country’s gross government debt­to­GDP ratio (Government 
debt) and its change over time (Change in Government debt). Information stems from the 
IMF’s Historical Debt Database (Abbas et al. 2010). We further add two dummy variables to 
account for past experiences with defaults (Default). The first variable takes a value of one if 
the sovereign has experienced a sovereign debt crisis or restructuring since 1970. The 
second variable takes a value of one if the sovereign has defaulted or restructured its debt in 
the last five years. Data on a country’s history of debt crises come from the IMF (Laeven and 
Valencia 2012). 
 External Performance. We add three variables to account for a sovereign’s external 
performance. Trade openness, i.e., the sum of the rated country’s exports and imports, and 
current account balance are both included as a share of GDP. Moreover, we account for 
debt owed to nonresidents (external debt), again as a share of GDP. All three variables are 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
                                               
22 Data are available at http://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed 31 July 2013). 
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Political and Institutional Performance. We control for eight political and 
institutional characteristics of the rated country. First, a sovereign’s regime type is captured 
using the “Polity 2” variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2013), which measures 
democracy on a 21­point scale (polity). Second, we include an election dummy that is coded 
as one if elections were held during the last 12 months. Third, years in office captures the 
number of years the chief executive has been in office as of January 1st. Fourth, a dummy 
for executive ideology (left government) is coded as one if the leader’s party is considered as 
communist, socialist, social democratic or other left­wing. The latter three variables have 
been obtained from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Fifth to eighth, 
we control for a country’s rule of law, absence of internal conflict, absence of external conflict 
and absence of military in politics. These variables are drawn from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), where higher values indicate a better institutional environment.23  
 We lag all time­varying variables for two reasons. First, the process of incorporating 
new data and political developments takes some time. Moreover, agencies have an 
incentive not to change their ratings too often, as very frequent changes would cast a bad 
picture on their long­term analytical skills. On average, agencies would rather wait if bad (or 
good) news are confirmed by other sources than to react immediately to changes in their 
indicators. If appropriate, we compute the moving average of each variable over the previous 
12 months. In other cases, in particular for more volatile variables capturing the current 
economic situation, we calculate the average over the last 36 months to cancel out pure 
business­cycle effects and random short­term fluctuations that should not influence long­
term debt repayment abilities (see Block and Vaaler 2004 for a similar approach). Online 
Appendix A4 provides precise definitions of all variables employed and their sources. Online 
Appendix A5 shows the corresponding descriptive statistics. 
 
  
                                               
23 The developments during the “Arab Spring” have shown how important these factors are for the 
stability and thus creditworthiness of a country. Data are available at 
http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx (last accessed 14 August 2013). 
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5.3 Variables of Interest 
We use eight variables to test for the existence of a home bias. As we will argue, all 
measures should – according to the official guidelines of the agencies – be unrelated to 
sovereign ratings, controlled for the variables introduced in the last subsection. Out of the 
ten, the variable that allows the most direct test of our hypothesis is a same country dummy 
variable. It takes a value of one if the rated country is the home country of the rating agency. 
We define an agency’s home country in the following two ways. According to the location 
definition, the home country is defined as the country in which the headquarters of the 
agency is physically located. Using the ownership­based definition, we code home countries 
according to the nationality of the major shareholder(s). Both definitions coincide in most 
cases; CI and Fitch are the only exceptions (see again Table 1 for details). A rejection of the 
null hypothesis of a zero coefficient on same country would empirically support the existence 
of a home bias as it indicates a preferential treatment of the home country.  
 If a home bias in sovereign ratings exists, rating agencies might not only assign 
favorable ratings to their home country, but also to countries with close economic ties, 
geopolitically­aligned countries and countries that are culturally closer. In the following, we 
introduce the variables employed in each of these three categories. 
 Economic interests. We account for two variables that capture economic links 
between the rated countries and the home country of the rating agency. First, export 
interests are measured by the rated country’s share in total exports from the home country. 
Export data are obtained from UN Comtrade and have been accessed via the World Bank’s 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software.24 While a sovereign’s access to foreign 
currency should matter for its ability to pay back its debt and is covered by our control 
variable current account balance, the sovereign’s relative importance as an export market for 
the home country of the rating agency should, all else being equal, be unrelated to rating 
outcomes. 
                                               
24 The online tool is available at http://wits.worldbank.org (accessed 4 December 2012). 
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 Second, we test for the role of bank exposure. The Bank for International Settlements 
provides data on bank exposure of all banks headquartered in most of our home countries.25 
It contains detailed information on all foreign claims to the public sector, banks, the non­bank 
private sector, and miscellaneous other claims. In addition, it covers potential exposures 
from derivatives contracts, guarantees and credit commitments. As our measure of bank 
exposure, we compute the rated country’s share in the total risk exposure of all home­
country banks. 
 Geopolitical alignment. We use two measures to test whether countries that are 
geopolitically aligned with the home country of the rating agency are favored in sovereign 
ratings. First, we use bilateral voting alignment in the UN General Assembly as a proxy for 
geopolitical alignment between the rated country and the home country of the rating agency. 
This is defined as the share of votes in which the rated country and the home country exhibit 
the same voting behavior, i.e., both voting yes, both voting no, or both abstaining (data from 
Strezhnev and Voeten 2012). Two voting blocs can be identified in the post­Cold War period: 
a Western bloc around the United States on the one hand and an anti­hegemonic bloc, 
which includes China, on the other (Voeten 2000). As an illustrative example, consider the 
case of Malaysia, which is strongly aligned with China and receives on average a two­step 
better rating from Dagong compared to the three big US agencies. Measures of UN voting 
alignment are widely used in the literature to measure bilateral affinity (e.g., Barro and Lee 
2005; Dreher and Gassebner 2008). For the US agencies in our sample, we employ a 
country’s share in US military aid as a second measure of geopolitical alignment. This 
variable serves as a proxy for the strategic importance that the United States assigns to 
these countries.26 
 Cultural distance. We use three measures of cultural distance. The first indicator is 
a simple dummy variable that takes a value of one if home and sovereign share the same 
official language (see also Guiso et al. 2009; data from Mayer and Zignago 2011). Moreover, 
we follow several studies that use more comprehensive measures of cultural distance (e.g., 
                                               
25 Unfortunately, no data are reported from Cyprus (CI) and China (Dagong). Data are available at 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm (accessed 3 December 2012). 
26
 Data are available at the USAID website at http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html 
(accessed 30 July 2013). 
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Guiso et al. 2009; Giannetti and Yafeh 2012). Specifically, we use two dimensions from 
Kolo’s (2012) distance­adjusted ethno­linguistic fractionalization index (DELF).27 The 
variable Cultural distance (language) measures linguistic differences based on language 
trees from the Ethnologue project, which classifies 6,656 distinct languages into families and 
branches due to their linguistic origin (Lewis 2009). As outlined before, larger cultural 
distance could be related to reduced information gathering and less optimistic risk 
perceptions. 
The third measure, cultural distance (ethno-racial) is derived from a biological 
taxonomy of species, based on genealogical relatedness. Kolo (2012) assigns six­letter 
codes, which are based on race, skin pigmentation and ethnic origin and allow more 
differentiation between genetic groups than mere genetic distance (as in Spolaore and 
Wacziarg 2009, for example). Ethno­racial distance can be seen as a proxy for economic 
discrimination based on race or ethnicity; however, it might also be related to trust towards 
the rated country. 
 Online Appendices A4 and A5 also provide definitions, sources and descriptive 
statistics for all variables of interest. Online Appendix A6 shows simple correlations with the 
average sovereign rating, and partial correlation holding GDP or the debt ratio constant. We 
now turn to our econometric estimations. 
  
                                               
27
 The approach in Kolo (2012) builds on the ethno­linguistic fractionalization index (ELF, Alesina et 
al. 2003). The cultural distance between two countries   and   is calculated as      =  1 −
∑ ∑        ̂  ,  
 
    
 
    
  ∙ 100. The calculation weighs each distinct group   within countries   and   
by their relative group size   . The product of the weights is multiplied with a similarity parameter 
 ̂  ,  , which varies between zero and one and takes the value of one if individuals belong to the 
same cultural group. The resulting      value gives the expected similarity between two randomly 
drawn individuals. 
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6. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
To test for the existence of a home bias in sovereign ratings, we estimate the determinants 
of sovereign ratings   , , , . Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation using 
ordinary least squares (OLS): 
   , , ,  =    , ,  +   , 
    +   , 
    +   ,  +    +   , , ,   (3) 
where   , ,  is a country­pair specific variable of interest,   ,   and   ,   are vectors that contain 
sovereign­specific economic and political control variables,   ,  and    are agency and 
period fixed effects, respectively, and   , , ,  the error term.
28 Error terms may be correlated 
at the agency­sovereign level, as well as at the sovereign level. In this case, it is appropriate 
to calculate cluster­robust standard errors at the most aggregate level of clustering, i.e., at 
the sovereign level in our case (Cameron et al. 2011). The time period under analysis runs 
from January 1990 to June 2013. In addition to our regression results for the full sample, we 
also show results for a sample restricted to the time after the onset of the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). We take September 2008 as the starting point for this period of increased 
uncertainty. In this month the bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers and American International 
Group (AIG) took place (for a detailed discussion of these events, see Mishkin 2010). Home­
country influences on sovereign ratings could have become more pronounced following the 
onset of the crisis. Investors became more risk­averse during the crisis; specifically doubts 
about the use of sovereign bonds as quasi risk­free assets in financial models have risen. 
Politicians, journalists and economists intensified their critique of the agencies’ decision­
making and increased the public pressure not to downgrade their countries. 
  
                                               
28 We use agency fixed effects rather than home­country fixed to account for differences in the 
average rating level that can exist between the agencies from one country. For example, in the United 
States, Moody’s could be systematically more pessimistic than S&P (or vice versa). The robustness 
section displays results with additional country­pair or rated­country fixed effects. Moreover, we show 
later that our results are qualitatively unchanged when we use ordered probit instead of OLS. 
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6.1 Baseline Regressions 
We start by running regressions for baseline specifications that exclude our variables of 
interest   , , . Since the previous literature has focused on ratings from the big U.S.­based 
agencies (and from Japanese agencies to a smaller extent), this exercise will show us 
whether our estimations with a larger set of agencies yield similar results. As can be seen 
from column 1 of Table 3, the results are in line with former studies focusing on fewer 
agencies and shorter time periods. Both GDP per capita and Inflation show the expected 
signs and are statistically significant at the one­percent level. In line with Hill et al. (2010), 
the positive effect of GDP growth is diminishing as indicated by the significant negative 
squared term. Natural resources shows a negative coefficient which is significant at the one­
percent level. Population is positive and significant at the one­percent level; larger countries 
thus receive on average better ratings. 
 Turning to fiscal stability, we find that change in government debt and government 
debt both have the expected negative coefficients, both being statistically significant at the 
ten­percent level. Even conditional on the other variable, both default variables turn out to be 
negative and significant at the one­percent level. The fact that a country has defaulted since 
1970 leads to a rating that is lower by 1.5 points on our 21­point scale. Countries that have 
defaulted over the last five years are further downgraded by 1.8 points on average. With 
regard to a country’s external performance, the coefficients on current account balance and 
external debt both show the expected sign, but only the former reaches statistical 
significance at conventional levels. Trade openness does not seem to further affect 
sovereign ratings conditional on the other factors. 
 Most political and institutional factors show the expected signs. The coefficient on 
rule of law is positive in accordance with Biglaiser and Staats (2012) and statistically 
significant at the one­percent level. In line with political­business­cycle considerations (Block 
and Vaaler 2004), rating levels during election years seem to be related to more uncertainty 
about future government policy, as indicated by the respective negative coefficient 
(significant at the ten­percent level). Rating agencies also provide better ratings to countries 
characterized by absence of external conflict and absence of military in politics. All other 
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political variables (polity, years in office, left government, and absence of internal conflict) do 
not reach statistical significance at conventional levels. 
 Our results for this baseline model are similar when we restrict the observation period 
to the time after the onset of the GFC, as can be seen in column 2.29 They are also robust to 
the inclusion of a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a country is a member of the 
Eurozone at a particular point in time (see columns 3 and 4). These countries have an 
additional source of funding; there is a certain likelihood that euro area members would bail 
out other members in the case of financial turmoil. For example, S&P’s criteria for rating 
sovereigns account for “special credit characteristics of sovereigns within a monetary union” 
since the June 2011 update (S&P 2012: 2). As the “implicit bailout” guarantee would 
suggest, the coefficient on euro area is positive and significant at the five­percent level in the 
full sample. Since euro area could be related to our variables of interest, we show our main 
results with and without this additional control. 
 These objective country­specific controls alone explain 86 percent of the variation in 
sovereign ratings, as indicated by the adjusted R­squared value. Our baseline model thus 
has strong explanatory power to predict sovereign ratings from this broad set of agencies. 
We proceed with the introduction of our variables of interest. 
 
6.2 Main Results 
To test whether sovereign ratings show evidence for a home bias, we now add one variable 
of interest at a time to the baseline specification introduced in the previous subsection. Each 
cell in Table 4 refers to one independent regression and shows the coefficient of the 
respective variable of interest. We again show results for the full sample (column 1) and the 
GFC sample (column 2) and also test whether our results are robust to the inclusion of euro 
area (columns 3 and 4).30 
                                               
29
 Change in government debt, election and absence of external conflict become statistically 
insignificant in the GFC period. 
30
 Online Appendix A7 shows separate results for the pre­GFC sample. 
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 As can be seen in column 1 from the positive coefficient on same country, which is 
significant at the five­percent level, agencies assign a rating that is 0.9 points higher to their 
home country than to other countries with the same characteristics. In other words, the rating 
of the home country is on average almost one point higher than what would be justified by 
how the agencies assess and weigh the economic and political fundamentals of other rated 
countries. The favorable treatment of the home country becomes more pronounced during 
the GFC period; the coefficient rises to 1.8 and becomes significant at the one­percent level 
(column 2). We obtain similar results when we control for euro area (columns 3 and 4). 
Taken together, this is strong evidence in favor of our first home­bias hypothesis. 
 Do rating agencies also favor countries that are economically, politically or culturally 
aligned with their home country? Starting with the measures of economic ties, our results 
partly support the notion that rating agencies favor countries economically aligned with their 
home country. While export interests does not show up significantly in the full sample 
(columns 1 and 3), the coefficient becomes significant at conventional levels in column 4. Its 
economic significance, however, is rather small; the export share of a rated country would 
have to increase by 26 percentage points to lead to a one­point rating increase. 
The second variable of economic ties, home­country bank exposure, is robustly 
related to sovereign ratings. The corresponding coefficient is positive as expected and 
significant at conventional levels in all estimations. The size of the effect is larger after the 
onset of the GFC, which could reflect the increased attention to risks posed by 
interdependencies between banks and state. According to column 4, an increase of the 
sovereign’s share in the home country’s bank exposure by 20 percentage points is related to 
a rating improvement of one point on the rating scale. Taken together, these results suggest 
that economic ties between home and sovereign are related to ratings. 
 With regard to geopolitical ties between the home country and the sovereign, we find 
at best weak support for our hypothesis. The coefficient on geopolitical alignment (UN) is 
positive as expected but only reaches statistical significance at conventional levels in the 
GFC period (columns 2 and 4). Its economic significance is negligible, however. In order to 
test whether this and the following effects are not just capturing the same­country effect 
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shown above, we further add the same country dummy in columns 5 and 6.31 It appears that 
the result is completely driven by the home country as the coefficient loses its statistical 
significance when we control for same country (column 6). We also find mixed results for the 
effect of US military interests (aid) on the rating behavior of the US agencies, which 
becomes statistically significant in the GFC period only. Taken together, geopolitical ties 
between home and sovereign do not appear to play a significant role in rating decisions. 
 We now turn to the role of cultural ties between the sovereign and the home country 
of the rating agency. The coefficient on common language is positive as expected and 
statistically significant at least at the five­percent level in all specification. Countries that 
share a common language with the home country on average receive a rating between 0.7 
to almost one full point higher. This also holds when we control for the same country dummy 
(columns 5 and 6). Language as a tool for communication could affect all home­sovereign 
relations, not only those in which both countries share a common language. Kolo’s (2012) 
cultural distance (language) variable provides a more nuanced measure of linguistic 
differences. Language dissimilarities reduce the amount of collected information and the 
predicted likelihood of default. Moreover, the less familiar a language, the less trust might be 
put into the message it delivers. The results in Table 4 support these ideas: the coefficient 
on cultural distance (language) is negative and significant at the one­percent level in all 
specifications. The coefficient is robust to the inclusion of euro area, and increases in the 
GFC period. It can be argued that overall trust has decreased after the Lehmann bankruptcy; 
as such, official numbers are regarded with more suspicion. It seems plausible that, in times 
of crises, heuristics such as relying on familiarity become more important to assess the 
reliability of available information. 
 The size of the effect is not negligible. Consider, for example, the linguistic difference 
between the United States and China (99), which is 20 percentage points higher than the 
difference between the United States and the Netherlands (79). A cultural distance in terms 
of language of 20 points relates to a lower rating of 0.6 points on average in the GFC period 
(column 4). This result is in line with findings of a “cultural home bias” for bank lending, 
                                               
31 Controlling for the same­country dummy (column 5 and 6) is not necessary for export interests and 
bank exposure as these variables are not coded for the home country. 
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investment decisions and trade patterns (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Guiso et al. 2009; 
Giannetti and Yafeh 2012). 
 Cultural distance (ethno-racial) between home and sovereign, however, appears to 
be unrelated to sovereign ratings across all specifications in Table 4. This means that we do 
not find empirical evidence of discriminatory behavior of rating agencies based on race or 
ethnicity. Rather, the “cultural home bias” appears to be a function of the availability of 
information and risk perceptions. Familiarity in terms of language also goes along with a 
general cultural familiarity, which can be conducive to bilateral trust and better cooperation in 
the rating process. In Section 6.4, we will further explore the transmission channel behind 
the “cultural home bias.” 
 Taken together, this is strong support for our home­bias hypothesis. Rating agencies 
provide preferential treatment to their home country and to countries economically and 
culturally aligned with it. Geopolitics, however, does not seem to play a significant role. 
 
6.3 Agency-specific Regressions 
Which rating agencies are subject to which biases? By pooling all agencies in one 
regression, we have assumed that each agency weighs all sovereign­specific factors in the 
same way as we were estimating a single coefficient per explanatory variable. Rating 
decisions were only allowed to differ by a constant term through agency fixed effects. We 
now relax this assumption and run individual regressions for each of the nine rating agencies 
under analysis. Specifically, we re­run the model presented in column 3 of Table 4, which 
includes the euro area dummy in addition to our control variables and period fixed effects. 
This analysis of the differences between agencies is crucial for the policy implications of our 
research. It allows us to see whether there are differences between the U.S.­based 
agencies, on which the public criticism has focused, and other, smaller agencies. 
 Table 5 shows the coefficients of our variable of interest when we run individual 
regressions for each agency.32 As can be seen from columns 1­9, there are large differences 
                                               
32 The interested reader will find the results for the control variables in Online Appendix A8. 
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across agencies. Four out of nine agencies provide a significantly higher rating to the 
country where their headquarters is based: CI, Fitch, R&I and S&P. While Fitch and S&P 
assign a rating to the United States that is on average almost one point higher than their 
treatment of other countries would justify, the home bias for CI and R&I in favor of Cyprus 
and Japan, respectively, is about twice and three times that size. For each agency’s home 
country, Figure 2 contrasts the actual rating and the predicted rating based on how each 
agency weighs the economic and political fundamentals of sovereigns. In other words, we 
compare the actual ratings (solid line) with the ratings that should be assigned to the home 
country if it were not the home country (dotted line). 
 The figure highlights several interesting observations. First, let us compare Fitch and 
S&P (significant positive same­country dummy in Table 5) with Moody’s (no significant bias). 
Despite the fact that S&P has downgraded the United States in August 2011, it should, given 
its own weights, downgrade it even further by about one point. We can also see that the 
initial decision to downgrade the United States came quite late, which can be interpreted as 
reluctance due to the expected political and media outcry. Fitch also seems to overrate the 
U.S. for nearly a decade, while Moody’s rating, given its treatment of others, has only quite 
recently begun to deviate from its predicted value. Second, while both JCR and R&I assign a 
21­point “AAA” rating to their home country Japan, there is only empirical evidence for a 
same­country effect for the latter agency. The dotted line indicates that if R&I would apply 
the same criteria to Japan as it does apply to other countries, the rating should be about two 
points lower than it is. Third, although there was no evidence of a same­country effect in 
Dagong’s rating decisions (see again Table 5), Dagong should consider a downgrade of its 
home country as China’s fundamentals started to deteriorate in 2012. 
 We now turn to our measures of economic interests between home and sovereign 
(see again Table 5). While we find a coefficient on export interests which is positive as 
expected and statistically significant at conventional levels only for Moody’s and S&P, our 
evidence on bank exposure is much more conclusive. For five out of seven agencies for 
which the data on bank exposure are available, the corresponding coefficient is found to be 
positive and statistically significant. The largest effect exists for S&P, where a ten­percent 
increase in the share of overall exposure to the rated country leads to an increase in the 
rating by 1.4 steps. 
 Geopolitical ties seem to be irrelevant for the decisions of most agencies. With 
regard to geopolitical alignment (UN), the coefficient is insignificant in most specifications. 
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However, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for China’s Dagong. It 
seems that Dagong assigns higher ratings to those countries that are politically more in line 
with the Chinese government. This effect is robust in terms of size and significance to the 
inclusion of the same country dummy (not displayed). This effect is sizable. A country 
receives a rating that is one full point higher if its political alignment with China increases by 
21 percentage points. This is approximately the difference between Brazil’s (90 percent) and 
Australia’s (70 percent) voting alignment in the UN General Assembly. We also find that two 
agencies provide a significantly lower rating to countries geopolitically aligned with their 
respective home country (Feri, JCR). Military interests (aid) remains insignificant for the 
U.S.­based agencies. We interpret this as evidence that the US agencies do not provide 
countries with a preferential treatment merely because they are of military interest to the US 
government. Overall, there is no robust evidence that geopolitical ties between home and 
sovereign have an impact on rating decisions. 
 Again, the results highlight the importance of cultural relatedness. The coefficients on 
common language are positive in all except one case, and the effect of cultural distance 
(language) is negative in all cases. For six out of nine agencies at least one of the two is 
statistically significant. DBRS, Fitch, Moody’s, R&I and S&P assign higher ratings for 
countries with a common language, significant at least at the ten­percent level. The more 
nuanced cultural distance (language) measure is significant at least at the ten­percent level 
for Canada­based DBRS, Germany­based Feri and all U.S.­based agencies. Agencies that 
seem to be less affected by this kind of cultural bias are CI, Dagong and JCR.33 Moreover, 
CI assigns lower ratings to countries that differ more from Cyprus in terms of ethnicity and 
race. 
 Finally, we consider our alternative definition of home country. Rather than defining 
the home country based on the location of the agency’s headquarter, we apply the 
ownership definition. Thus, CI is coded as “Kuwait” and Fitch is coded as “France.” As can 
be seen from column 10 of Table 4, Kuwait does not receive a favorable treatment from CI 
                                               
33
 For CI, the large negative coefficient on common language, though insignificant, is at first sight 
surprising. This result can be explained by Cyprus’ division into Greek and Turkish parts. The 
negative coefficient stems from a negative bias against Turkey as it shrinks to ­0.2 when leaving 
Turkey out of the sample. 
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as it is the case for Cyprus, the location of CI’s headquarters. However, CI assigns lower 
ratings to countries that are linguistically or ethno­racially more distant from Kuwait. This 
might be explained by a large share of employees of Arabic origin. For Fitch, we find a 
positive coefficient on same country when we apply the ownership definition instead of the 
location definition (column 11). Its rating of France is one point better than what would be 
justified by Fitch’s treatment of other countries. The variables for cultural distance are all 
insignificant in contrast to the results with the U.S. as the home country in column 5. As it 
does not seem that Fimalac’s majority shareholdings are reflected in a particularly high 
number of French staff, this is not surprising. In summary, these results can be taken as 
evidence that it is not only the location of an agency that matters for rating outcomes but 
also the ownership structure. 
 
6.4 Robustness and Exploration of Transmission Channels 
In this subsection, we test for the robustness of our results with respect to alterations in the 
empirical strategy and further explore the mechanisms how culture affects sovereign ratings. 
First, we replicate our main results using ordered probit. Until now, we have treated our 
dependent variable as cardinal. This implies that the difference between an “AA” and an 
“AA+” rating, for example, is the same as between “BB” and “BB+.” In most settings, this 
choice should have little effect on the direction and significance of variables if the number of 
response categories is sufficiently large (see Ferrer­i­Carbonell and Frijters 2004, for 
example). Nonetheless, we rerun our specification using ordered probit to take account of 
potential non­linear effects. When comparing these estimates to our previous findings using 
OLS from Table 4, our main results are very similar and no coefficient loses its statistical 
significance with the exception of export interests in the GFC sample (see Online Appendix 
A9 for full regression results). 
 Second, we address potential omitted variable bias in several ways. As a first 
exercise, we include all significant variables from our main specification (Table 4, column 3) 
in a single equation to test whether the individual effects still remain significant when they 
are jointly included. Countries that are culturally close to the home country could also be 
those with which the home country entertains close economic relations (Guiso et al. 2009). 
After adding one of the two language variables in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, respectively, 
the coefficients on bank exposure remain stable and statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Also, both common language and cultural distance (language) keep their signs and 
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remain statistically significant. We conclude that the effect of economic ties is not (entirely) 
driven by cultural distance between the home country and the sovereigns as the effect of the 
former remains significant when we control for the latter. Next, we explore if both language 
variables are substitutes for each other. As bank exposure is not available for China, Cyprus, 
the home country itself and years prior to 2005, column 3 excludes this measure and 
focuses on the language variables. Conditioning on each other lowers the coefficients in 
absolute terms, but both language variables stay significant at the five percent­level. When 
we add the same country dummy in column 4, the coefficient on same country becomes 
insignificant. This suggests that cultural proximity is the main transmission channel that 
causes the favorable treatment of the home country. 
Another omitted factor could be related to the business model of rating agencies, 
specifically to conflicts of interest that arise from the “issuer­pays” model. White (2010: 215) 
suggests that a “rating agency might shade its rating upward so as to keep the issuer happy 
and forestall the issuer’s taking its rating business to a different rating agency.” One might 
thus suspect that countries that pay for their ratings would be treated more favorably. S&P is 
the only agency that publishes information on which countries receive unsolicited ratings. 
These countries are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, France, India, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States (as of June 2013). As can be seen from Online Appendix A10, accounting for 
a dummy that indicates an unsolicited rating and its interaction with our variables of interest 
does not qualitatively alter our results for S&P (compare Table 5 column 9). 
Our main regressions in previous tables include time and agency fixed effects as we 
want to exploit cross­country variation. However, our results are also robust to the inclusion 
of additional fixed effects. Specifically, we include agency­sovereign­pair fixed effects   , ,  in 
addition to time fixed effects for those variables of interest that vary over time. For the time­
invariant variables, we employ rated­country fixed effects   		instead.
34 While column 1 of 
Table 7 displays the main results from Table 4 (column 3) for the reader’s convenience, 
column 2 shows the results with the additional controls. Same country, bank exposure and 
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 Using the notation from equation (3), we thus estimate the regression equation   , , ,  =    , ,  +
  , 
    +   , 
    +   , ,  +    +   , , ,  	for time­varying variables of interest and   , , ,  =    ,  +   , 
    +   , 
    +
+  ,  +    +    +   , , ,  	for those that do not vary over time. 
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cultural distance (language) are robust to the inclusion of additional fixed effects. While 
common language loses its statistical significance, export interests, geopolitical alignment 
(UN) and US military interests (aid) remain insignificant. 
 Third, we control for selection of countries into the sample of rated countries. For 
example, a sovereign could be more likely to request a rating from an agency from which it 
expects a more favorable rating. To control for a possible selection bias, we rerun our model 
from Table 4 (column 3) as a Heckman selection model. However, it is difficult to find a 
suitable exclusion variable. When they predict the probability that Moody’s and S&P assign a 
rating to a particular sovereign, Beaulieu et al. (2012) use decade fixed effects and a rated 
country’s exports to the United States as exclusion variables. While the former is meant to 
capture a positive trend in the total number of rated countries, the latter intends to proxy for 
“a country’s friendliness with major western powers” (Beaulieu et al. 2012: 721). However, 
there are reasons to doubt that either of these two variables satisfies the exclusion 
restriction. While decade fixed effects could reflect the global economic situation and thus 
directly impact rating levels, home­country export patterns might be related to rating 
outcomes, as our paper argues. Note also that we find export interests to be significantly 
related to rating outcomes in our regressions for Moody’s and S&P (Table 5, columns 7 and 
9). Instead, we choose to start by estimating a Heckman model without exclusion variables. 
We then use the number of sovereigns that are rated by the respective agency in the 
previous period, the number of the big three agencies that rate a sovereign in the previous 
period, or both as exclusion variables. Arguably, a sovereign is more likely to be rated by an 
agency if that agency covers a larger set of countries and if the market­dominating agencies 
rate a particular country. At the same time, it is difficult to come up with an explanation why 
these two measures of country coverage should directly affect rating levels. Our results are 
very similar to those when we do not account for selection (see Online Appendix A11 for full 
regression results). 
 Fourth, we examine the transmission channels of cultural distance in more detail. 
The insignificant coefficients for cultural distance (ethno-racial) suggest that discrimination 
based on race and ethnicity is unrelated to rating outcomes. The two remaining theoretical 
explanations for the role of culture, namely superior information and differences in risk 
perception, are both consistent with the negative effect of cultural distance (language) on 
sovereign ratings. If information was the only transmission channel, we would expect that the 
bias is alleviated by the existence of a foreign office in the rated country. Giannetti and Yafeh 
(2012), for example, find that the cultural bias in bank lending is mitigated when banks have 
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a subsidiary in the foreign country. To test for this transmission channel, we code a dummy 
variable office that takes a value of one if an agency has an office in the rated country. Since 
only the big U.S.­based agencies have foreign offices on a global scale (Fitch: 34, Moody’s: 
24, S&P: 24), we restrict our analysis to these three agencies. Table 8 shows that both office 
as well as the interaction between the dummy variable and cultural distance (language) are 
not statistically significant at conventional levels for any of the agencies. The coefficient on 
cultural distance (language) remains negative and statistically significant in all specifications. 
These results show that local presence of agency staff does not mitigate the cultural home 
bias. This suggests that it is not just the availability of information that drives the effect of 
cultural distance. The remaining explanation for the cultural bias is a less optimistic 
perception of risks of culturally less similar countries. 
 Finally, we run quantile regressions to learn more about the mechanisms behind the 
effect of cultural distance. Quantile regression serves as a test as to whether our results are 
driven by outliers by showing the size and direction of the effect of culture at different 
quantiles of the rating distribution. Moreover, it allows us to test whether the effect of cultural 
distance on ratings is larger for countries at the lower end of the distribution. Financial 
information of less developed countries, with on average lower ratings, is often of poor 
quality and little credibility (Ahearne et al. 2004). In these cases, differences in risk 
perceptions should become more important. As expected, the negative effect of cultural 
distance (language) on rating outcomes is indeed larger for countries at the lower end of the 
rating distribution (see Table 9). It increases in absolute terms from ­0.012 at the .8 quantile 
to ­0.021 at the .2 quantile. The effect of cultural distance (language) is consistently negative 
and significant across the rating distribution. Comparing these findings with results for the 
GFC sample, we find the largest difference in the size of the effect at the lower end of the 
rating distribution. At the .2 and .4 quantile the negative coefficient nearly doubles in the 
GFC period, while at the upper end the differences are much smaller compared to the full 
sample. These results suggest that the differences in risk perceptions rooted in culture are 
larger when uncertainty is higher. The coefficient on cultural distance (ethno-racial) is also 
increasing in absolute terms from the low to the high quantiles, but remains insignificant in all 
specifications. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Observers frequently perceive sovereign ratings to be biased and doubt that they accurately 
reflect the economic and political fundamentals of the rated countries. Many of these 
concerns reflect the idea that the home country of credit rating agencies has a systematic 
influence on rating outcomes. This article refers to a home bias in sovereign ratings if a 
rating agency gives preferential treatment to its respective home country and to countries 
with close economic, political and cultural ties to its home. Building on the respective 
literatures on political economy influences in economic assessments and on cultural biases 
in financial decision­making, we discussed potential reasons for such a bias. 
To test whether there is empirical support for a home bias, we collected rating data 
from nine agencies based in six countries. While most of the variation in ratings is explained 
by the economic and political fundamentals of rated countries, the results suggest that 
sovereign ratings in fact exhibit a bias. We find that the average agency assigns a rating to 
its home country that is almost one point higher than justified by how it assesses other 
sovereigns. Furthermore, there is some evidence that agencies on average favor countries 
that share strong economic ties with the home country. All else being equal, countries to 
which home­country banks have a larger risk exposure obtain better ratings. While there is 
no robust empirical support that geopolitical ties between home and sovereign play a 
significant role in rating outcomes, countries that are culturally closer receive a better 
treatment. The larger the linguistic differences between home and sovereign, i.e., the more 
unfamiliar a language, the lower the assigned rating. We conclude that the home bias is 
mainly the result of economic interests and culture, not geopolitical motives. These results 
are robust to the choice of estimation methods, the inclusion of country­pair or rated­country 
fixed effects, and selection into the sample of rated countries. We find that the effects of 
bank exposure and cultural distance appear to be largely independent of one another. 
Moreover, cultural distance seems to be the main transmission channel that causes the 
same­country effect. 
Our results show substantial variation across agencies. Specifically, four agencies 
provide significantly better ratings to their home country than what would be justified by their 
assessments of the economic and political fundamentals of other sovereigns. Moreover, five 
agencies assign significantly better ratings to those countries in which home­country banks 
possess higher foreign claims, and six out of nine agencies are affected by cultural distance 
as measured by linguistic differences or common language. 
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With regard to cultural distance, we hypothesized that the bias could arise from a 
lack of information, differences in risk perceptions or simply from discrimination. We find no 
support for discrimination based on ethno­racial differences between home and sovereign. If 
the differences were solely due to a lack of information, the existence of an office in a rated 
country should alleviate the bias. However, when we interact the existence of an office with 
cultural distance, the bias is not mitigated. Thus, the most plausible explanation appears to 
be that cultural distance is related to more pessimistic risk perceptions which lead to lower 
ratings. 
These results should not be taken as evidence that rating agencies do not fulfil an 
economically relevant and potentially efficiency­enhancing role. “Objective” sovereign­
specific economic and political fundamentals explain most of the variation in sovereign 
ratings. Still, the economic significance of the home bias is not negligible. Biases of one 
rating point can make a big difference for the degree to which a country has access to 
international capital markets. This holds in particular as long as many large investors still 
depend on credit ratings for their portfolio choices. That said, our finding of a “cultural home 
bias” does not necessarily reflect “irrational behavior on behalf of the agencies. Their 
judgments are based on imperfect information provided by the rated countries as well as 
third parties. It can be rational to rely on heuristics such as bilateral trust to evaluate this 
information, which can lead to a lower perceived likelihood that a more familiar state defaults 
on its debt. 
There are important policy implications from our results. Regulation should aim at 
fostering competition and decrease the reliance on few big agencies. While transparency 
can be beneficial, overly rigid regulatory frameworks could prevent rating agencies from 
adequately and quickly adjusting their methodologies and models to new circumstances and 
thus lower market efficiency. Attempts to limit the maximum number of rating updates to 
three times a year for unsolicited ratings (as proposed by the European Commission) would 
particularly affect smaller agencies who issue fewer solicited ratings. Hence this regulatory 
measure could stifle competition. A more promising approach that is in line with our results 
would be to explicitly embrace the plurality of methods and opinions. In cases where 
economic arguments support the use of external ratings, regulation should require ratings by 
several agencies, ideally from different countries and cultural backgrounds. This would 
provide a more comprehensive risk assessment and automatically lead to a more diverse 
and competitive rating agency landscape. 
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Table 1: Overview on major credit rating agencies 
Agency Headquarters Founded 
Sov. 
rating 
since 
Country 
offices 
Staff Ownership as of December 2012 Ownership history 
Number of rated 
sovereigns by 
the end of 
2000 2012 
CI 
Limassol, 
Cyprus 
1982 2002 3 ~20 
100% privately owned by Afaf Adham, Amin Diab, Zafer Diab and the Gulf 
Master International Co. (privately­owned Kuwaiti Company); none of the 
shareholders has majority or voting control 
No publicly known changes ­ 37 
Dagong 
Beijing, 
China 
1994 2010 3 ~600 
100% privately owned; major shareholder Guan Jianzhong (former Chinese 
government official) 
Privately owned since foundation; 
Guan Jianzhong became major 
shareholder and president in 1998 
­ 72 
DBRS 
Toronto, 
Canada 
1976 1998 3 ~200 100% privately owned by Walter Schroeder since 1976 No publicly known changes 1 25 
Feri 
Bad 
Homburg, 
Germany 
1987 1999 5 ~50 
100% owned by MLP AG (publicly­traded German company) since 2011; 
major shareholders of MLP are Manfred Lautenschläger (23.38%), Harris 
Associates (9.82%), Swiss Life (9.9%), HDI Talanx AG (9.89%), Allianz SE 
(6.27%) 
30% owned by Harald Quandt Holding 
GmbH and 70% owned by Feri 
partners until 2006; MLP AG acquired 
56,6% including the 30% stake of the 
Quandt Holding GmbH in 2006 
55 56 
Fitch 
New York, 
USA; 
London, 
UK 
1913 1994 34 ~2,000 
50% Hearst Corporation (family­owned US­based multinational mass media 
group) and 50% Fimalac (French holding company, major owner Marc 
Ladreit de Lacharrière) 
Part of Fitch Group (100% owned by 
Fimalac) until 2006; 20% were sold to 
the Hearst Corporation in 2006, 
additional 20% in 2009 and another 
10% in 2012 
69 101 
JCR 
Tokyo, 
Japan 
1985 1998 1 ~90 
Stock company, largest shareholders: Jiji Press, Ltd. (19.71%), JCR 
employees’ stock ownership associations (6.51%), K.K. Kyodo News 
(5.93%), Sumitomo Life Insurance Company (2.68%), Meiji Yasuda Life 
Insurance Company (2.68%) 
No publicly known changes 21 33 
Moody’s 
New York, 
USA 
1909 1949 24 ~6,800 
Publicly traded since 2000; institutional ownership: 95.34%; top 5 
institutional shareholders: Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (13.4%), Capital World 
Investors (8.1%), Vanguard Group Inc. (6.2%), Bank of New York Mellon 
Corp (4%), Massachusetts Financial Services Co. (3.8%); further 
shareholders: BlackRock, Morgan Stanley, State Street, Northern Trust 
Corp., T. Rowe Price Associates 
Owned by US company Dun & 
Bradstreet from 1961­2000 
82 113 
R&I 
Tokyo, 
Japan 
1998 1998 2 ~250 
Stock company and part of Nikkei Group; largest shareholders: Nikkei, Inc. 
(42.72%), Nikkei Business Publications, Inc. (13.41%), Quick Corp. 
(8.24%), The Bank of Tokyo­Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. (4.91%), Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corp. (4.60%) 
Established through the merger 
between Japan Bond Research 
Institute and Nippon Investors Service, 
Inc. 
42 44 
S&P 
New York, 
USA 
1860 1949 24 ~5,000 
100% owned by McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., since 1966; major 
shareholders of the publicly­traded McGraw Hill Companies: Capital World 
Investors, Vanguard Group, State Street Corp., Oppenheimer Funds Inc., 
Morgan Stanley, Inc.; further shareholders: BlackRock, Bank of New York 
Mellon Corp., Northern Trust Corp., T. Rowe Price Associates 
In 1941, merger of Poor’s Publishing 
(founded 1860) and Standard 
Statistics (founded in 1906) 
87 125 
Sources: Personal communication with Moody’s Client Services (28 February 2013, 4 March 2013, 22 March 2013, 25 March 2013), Feri EuroRating Services AG (14 March 2013, 21 March 2013), 
Dagong Global Credit Rating (5 April 2013, 3 June 2013), and internet research (see Online Appendix A2 for a detailed list of sources). 
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Table 2: Sovereign ratings of home countries (as of June 2013) 
 Canada China Cyprus Germany France Japan Kuwait United States 
Home agencies AAA (21) AAA (21) B (7) AAA (21) AAA (21) AAA (20.5) AA­ (18) AAA (20.7) 
Other agencies AAA (20.7) AA­ (18) CCC (4.4) AAA (20.9) AA+ (19.9) A+ (17.4) AA (19) AA+ (19.8) 
Note: Each cell displays the three­letter rating. In case more than one (home or other) agency assigns a rating to a particular 
country, the table displays the average rating from either all home agencies or all other agencies. 
 
Table 3: Determinants of sovereign ratings (baseline models, all agencies pooled) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Controlled for euro area 
  Full sample GFC sample Full sample GFC sample 
GDP per capita (log) 2.222*** [0.000] 2.243*** [0.000] 2.168*** [0.000] 2.185*** [0.000] 
GDP growth 0.260*** [0.004] 0.379*** [0.001] 0.274*** [0.002] 0.398*** [0.001] 
GDP growth squared ­0.011* [0.087] ­0.022** [0.012] ­0.012* [0.063] ­0.024*** [0.009] 
Inflation ­9.521*** [0.000] ­16.935*** [0.001] ­9.524*** [0.000] ­17.301*** [0.000] 
Natural resources ­0.035*** [0.006] ­0.031** [0.045] ­0.032** [0.012] ­0.030* [0.059] 
Population (log) 0.748*** [0.000] 0.838*** [0.000] 0.733*** [0.000] 0.832*** [0.000] 
Change in government debt ­0.045* [0.056] 0.006 [0.920] ­0.038* [0.097] 0.019 [0.709] 
Government debt ­0.008* [0.057] ­0.023*** [0.002] ­0.009** [0.050] ­0.024*** [0.002] 
Default (since 1970) ­1.483*** [0.000] ­1.155*** [0.001] ­1.413*** [0.000] ­1.086*** [0.002] 
Default (last 5 years) ­1.832*** [0.000] ­4.381*** [0.000] ­1.871*** [0.000] ­4.403*** [0.000] 
Trade openness 0.003 [0.226] 0.000 [0.998] 0.002 [0.292] 0.000 [0.880] 
Current account balance 0.077*** [0.000] 0.095*** [0.000] 0.079*** [0.000] 0.099*** [0.000] 
External debt ­0.284 [0.609] ­0.526 [0.374] ­0.200 [0.717] ­0.391 [0.517] 
Rule of law 0.498*** [0.000] 0.406** [0.017] 0.507*** [0.000] 0.419** [0.013] 
Polity 0.005 [0.823] ­0.004 [0.892] 0.003 [0.903] ­0.006 [0.840] 
Election ­0.101* [0.067] ­0.067 [0.426] ­0.095* [0.088] ­0.070 [0.417] 
Years in office 0.016 [0.387] 0.019 [0.378] 0.013 [0.457] 0.016 [0.448] 
Left government ­0.064 [0.752] 0.116 [0.672] ­0.055 [0.790] 0.097 [0.715] 
Absence of internal conflict ­0.040 [0.650] 0.235 [0.156] ­0.026 [0.774] 0.250 [0.136] 
Absence of external conflict 0.269** [0.018] 0.065 [0.680] 0.217** [0.047] 0.006 [0.972] 
Absence of military in politics 0.334*** [0.008] 0.460*** [0.006] 0.343*** [0.007] 0.469*** [0.005] 
Euro area ­ ­ ­ ­ 0.610** [0.032] 0.554 [0.190] 
Adj. R­Squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
Number of observations 74,701 26,605 74,701 26,605 
Number of rated countries  107 104 107 104 
Notes: The dependent variable is a country’s sovereign rating on a 21­point scale. All regressions include time and agency 
fixed effects. The full sample contains data from January 1990 to June 2013. The GFC sample runs from September 2008 to 
June 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the sovereign level. ***,**,* indicate significance at the one­percent, five­percent or 
ten­percent level. P­values are displayed in brackets.  
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Table 4: Home bias in sovereign ratings (all agencies pooled) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
Controlled for 
euro area 
Controlled for 
euro area and 
same country 
  
Full 
sample 
GFC 
sample 
Full 
sample 
GFC 
sample 
Full 
sample 
GFC 
sample 
(a) Same country 0.935** 1.849*** 1.025** 1.924*** 
  
  [0.023] [0.000] [0.016] [0.000] 
  
(b) Export interests 0.010 0.030 0.018 0.038*   
  [0.565] [0.132] [0.321] [0.065]   
(c) Bank exposure 0.038* 0.043* 0.042** 0.049**   
  [0.073] [0.071] [0.045] [0.037]   
(d) Geopolitical alignment (UN) 0.005 0.014*** 0.005 0.013** ­0.001 0.007 
  [0.362] [0.007] [0.401] [0.010] [0.929] [0.272] 
(e) US military interests (aid) 0.031 0.099* 0.036 0.105** 0.036 0.105** 
  [0.289] [0.058] [0.205] [0.042] [0.205] [0.042] 
(f) Common language 0.700*** 0.825*** 0.787*** 0.923*** 0.736*** 0.759** 
  [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.018] 
(g) Cultural distance (language) ­0.020*** ­0.027*** ­0.021*** ­0.028*** ­0.021*** ­0.025*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
(h) Cultural distance (ethno­racial) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 
  [0.778] [0.627] [0.809] [0.557] [0.478] [0.130] 
Notes: The dependent variable is a country’s sovereign rating on a 21­point scale. Each cell refers to a separate regression. 
The table displays only the coefficients on the respective variable of interest of each regression. All regressions contain the 
control variables as specified in Table 3, time and agency fixed effects. The full sample contains data from January 1990 to 
June 2013 (column 1 and 2). The GFC sample runs from September 2008 to June 2013 (column 3 and 4). Controlling for the 
same country dummy (column 5 and 6) is not necessary in the case of export interests and bank exposure as these variables 
are not coded for the home country. Standard errors are clustered at the sovereign level. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 
one­percent, five­percent or ten­percent level. P­values are displayed in brackets. 
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Table 5: Home bias in sovereign ratings (by agency, full sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
  CI Dagong DBRS Feri Fitch JCR Moody’s R&I S&P CI Fitch 
  CYP CHN CAN DEU USA JPN USA JPN USA KWT FRA 
(a) Same country 3.026*** 0.002 0.992 ­0.400 0.950* 0.760 0.339 2.092** 0.912* ­0.789 0.957*** 
  [0.003] [0.999] [0.208] [0.357] [0.053] [0.503] [0.517] [0.018] [0.057] [0.483] [0.001] 
(b) Export interests ­0.342** ­0.022 ­0.002 0.070 0.034 0.082 0.044** 0.010 0.052** 0.592 0.067 
  [0.015] [0.823] [0.936] [0.362] [0.223] [0.107] [0.041] [0.821] [0.031] [0.392] [0.166] 
(c) Bank exposure   ­0.015 0.125*** 0.109** 0.059** 0.066* 0.045 0.142*** ­0.009* 0.050 
    [0.290] [0.003] [0.015] [0.027] [0.097] [0.121] [0.001] [0.078] [0.248] 
(d) Geopolitical alignment (UN) ­0.055 0.047** ­0.014 ­0.074*** 0.015 ­0.069*** 0.003 ­0.041 ­0.001 0.020 ­0.018 
  [0.433] [0.038] [0.740] [0.000] [0.227] [0.004] [0.841] [0.157] [0.920] [0.640] [0.328] 
(e) US military interests (aid)     0.030  0.038*  0.020   
      [0.287]  [0.084]  [0.544]   
(f) Common language ­1.841 0.532 1.125* 0.674 0.900*** 0.760 0.975*** 2.092** 0.923*** 2.150 ­0.074 
  [0.206] [0.659] [0.074] [0.178] [0.001] [0.503] [0.002] [0.018] [0.000] [0.103] [0.832] 
(g) Cultural distance (language) ­0.010 ­0.013 ­0.048** ­0.018* ­0.030** ­0.004 ­0.024** ­0.016 ­0.030*** ­0.031* 0.004 
  [0.658] [0.597] [0.023] [0.059] [0.018] [0.754] [0.027] [0.113] [0.002] [0.062] [0.571] 
(h) Cultural distance (ethno­racial) ­0.019* 0.011 0.003 0.001 ­0.011 0.006 0.002 ­0.007 ­0.002 ­0.032* 0.000 
  [0.080] [0.211] [0.886] [0.823] [0.315] [0.367] [0.838] [0.487] [0.856] [0.071] [0.993] 
Notes: The dependent variable is a country’s sovereign rating on a 21­point scale. Each cell refers to a separate regression. The table displays only the coefficients on the respective variable of 
interest of each regression. All regressions contain the control variables as specified in Table 3, time and agency fixed effects. Data range from January 1990 to June 2013. The GFC sample runs 
from September 2008 to June 2013. Columns (1) to (9) define the home country based on the agency’s headquarters; columns (10) and (11) based on the ownership definition. Standard errors are 
clustered at the sovereign level. ***,**,* indicate significance at the one­percent, five­percent or ten­percent level. P­values are displayed in brackets. 
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Table 6: Home bias in sovereign ratings (all agencies pooled, robustness checks) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank exposure 0.033** 0.032*   
 [0.045] [0.064]   
Common language 0.810*** 
 
0.531** 0.532** 
 [0.010] 
 
[0.043] [0.044] 
Cultural distance (language) 
 
­0.021** ­0.014** ­0.014** 
 
 
[0.036] [0.026] [0.032] 
Same country    ­0.026 
    [0.947] 
Agency fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R­squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Observations 37743 37743 74701 74701 
Notes: The dependent variable is a country’s sovereign rating on a 21­point scale. The table displays only the coefficients on 
the respective variables of interest of each regression. All regressions contain the control variables as specified in Table 3, 
Euro area, agency and time fixed effects. Data range from January 1990 to June 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the 
sovereign level. ***,**,* indicate significance at the one­percent, five­percent or ten­percent level. P­values are displayed in 
brackets. 
 
 
Table 7: Home bias in sovereign ratings (all agencies pooled, additional fixed effects) 
 
 
(1) (2) 
(a) Same country 1.025*** Agency FE 0.682*** Agency and sovereign FE 
 [0.001]  [0.006]  
(b) Export interests 0.018 Agency FE ­0.112 Agency­sovereign pair FE 
 
[0.163]  [0.193]  
(c) Bank exposure 0.042*** Agency FE 0.123** Agency­sovereign pair FE 
 
[0.001]  [0.022]  
(d) Political alignment (UN) 0.005 Agency FE 0.003 Agency­sovereign pair FE 
 
[0.304]  [0.862]  
(e) US military interests (aid) 0.018 Agency FE 0.023 Agency­sovereign pair FE 
 
[0.191]  [0.522]  
(f) Common language 0.787*** Agency FE 0.073 Agency and sovereign FE 
  [0.000]  [0.769]  
(g) Cultural distance (language) ­0.021*** Agency FE ­0.008** Agency and sovereign FE 
  [0.000]  [0.016]  
(h) Cultural distance (ethno­racial) 0.001 Agency FE 0.003 Agency and sovereign FE 
 [0.841]  [0.203]  
Notes: The dependent variable is a country’s sovereign rating on a 21­point scale. Each cell refers to a separate regression. 
The table displays only the coefficients on the respective variable of interest of each regression. All regressions contain the 
control variables as specified in Table 3, time fixed effects as well as the fixed effects specified in the table. Data range from 
January 1990 to June 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the sovereign level. ***,**,* indicate significance at the one­
percent, five­percent or ten­percent level. P­values are displayed in brackets. 
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Table 8: Do foreign offices decrease the effect of linguistic differences? 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P 
Cultural distance (language) ­0.033* ­0.030** ­0.029** 
[0.095] [0.019] [0.025] 
Office in rated country ­0.429 ­0.984 0.224 
[0.797] [0.494] [0.846] 
Cultural distance * Office 0.004 0.015 ­0.003 
[0.838] [0.378] [0.833] 
Notes: The dependent variable is a country’s sovereign rating on a 21­point scale. Each column refers to a separate 
regression. The table displays only the coefficients on the respective variable of interest of each regression. All regressions 
contain the control variables as specified in Table 3, time and agency fixed effects. Data range from January 1990 to June 
2013. Standard errors are clustered at the agency­sovereign level. ***,**,* indicate significance at the one­percent, five­percent 
or ten­percent level. P­values are displayed in brackets. 
 
 
Table 9: The effect of cultural distance on ratings at different quantiles (all agencies pooled) 
  20% 40% 60% 80% 
(g) Cultural distance (language) 
Full sample 
­0.021*** ­0.015*** ­0.012*** ­0.012*** 
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
(h) Cultural distance (ethno­racial) ­0.004 ­0.003 ­0.002 ­0.001 
  [0.298] [0.359] [0.578] [0.800] 
(g) Cultural distance (language) 
GFC sample 
­0.039*** ­0.028*** ­0.017*** ­0.016*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(h) Cultural distance (ethno­racial) ­0.004 ­0.001 0.000 ­0.000 
  [0.316] [0.840] [0.937] [0.904] 
Notes: The dependent variable is a country’s sovereign rating on a 21­point scale. Each cell refers to a separate regression. 
The table displays only the coefficients on the respective variable of interest of each regression. All regressions contain the 
control variables as specified in Table 3, time and agency fixed effects. Data range from January 1990 to June 2013. Standard 
errors are clustered at the agency­sovereign level. ***,**,* indicate significance at the one­percent, five­percent or ten­percent 
level. P­values are displayed in brackets. 
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the rating process 
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Figure 2: Actual rating levels versus predicted values 
 
Notes: This figure contrasts the actual rating and the predicted rating based on how each agency weighs the economic and political fundamentals of sovereigns. The solid 
lines depict the actual ratings, the dotted lines the ratings that should be assigned to the home country based only on the economic and political fundamentals. 
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Appendix 1: Sovereign ratings by agency and country (as of 28 June 2013) 
(a) CI (Cyprus/Kuwait) 
 
(b) Dagong (China) 
 
(c) DBRS (Canada) 
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Appendix 1 (continued): Sovereign ratings by agency and country (as of 28 June 2013) 
(d) Feri (Germany) 
 
(e) Fitch (USA/France) 
 
(f) JCR (Japan) 
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Appendix 1 (continued): Sovereign ratings by agency and country (as of 28 June 2013) 
(g) Moody’s (USA) 
 
(h) R&I (Japan) 
 
(i) S&P (USA) 
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Appendix 2: Comparison of credit rating process (sovereign ratings) 
Sources: Personal communication with Moody’s Client Services (28 February 2013, 4 March 2013, 22 March 2013, 25 March 2013), Feri EuroRating Services AG (14 March 2013, 21 March 2013), 
Dagong Global Credit Rating (5 April 2013, 3 June 2013), and internet research (see Online Appendix A2 for a detailed list of sources). Note: *: for solicited ratings only  
Agency CI Dagong DBRS Feri Fitch JCR Moody’s R&I S&P 
Home country (location) Cyprus China Canada Germany USA Japan USA Japan USA 
Home country (ownership) Kuwait China Canada Germany France Japan USA Japan USA 
Does the agency provide 
­ solicited ratings? 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
­ unsolicited rating? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
How long does a typical rating 
process take? 
Unspecified Unspecified No information 10­30 days 30­60 days 60 days 60­90 days Unspecified 30­45 days 
How many analysts are involved in 
the rating process (per sovereign 
rating)? 
One analyst 
Project team (several 
analysts) 
One analyst 
One/two analysts 
and compliance 
officer 
Two analysts 
Two 
analysts 
One analyst Several analysts Two analysts 
Does the agency collect and 
analyze publically available data? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Does the agency make an official 
cooperation offer to the sovereign? 
Yes Yes Yes* No Yes Yes* Yes Yes* Yes 
Does an interview with the 
sovereign take place? 
No* No* Yes* No* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* 
Does the lead analyst submit a 
rating proposal to the rating 
committee? 
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Who is part of the rating committee 
responsible for the final rating 
decision? 
Several 
analysts 
and 
chairperson 
Project team, external 
experts and 
compliance officer 
No information Three or four 
At least five 
analysts and 
senior director 
At least four Unspecified 
Several analysts 
and chairperson 
Five to seven 
analysts and 
chairperson 
Are the issuers notified prior to the 
publication of the rating? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Can sovereigns appeal against a 
rating publication? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Surveillance: Is there a regular 
updating interval? 
Unspecified At least annually Monthly Monthly At least annually Monthly Quarterly Unspecified Unspecified 
Who initiates an update? 
Lead 
analyst 
Project team 
Surveillance 
analysts 
Lead analyst(s) 
and rating 
committee 
All analysts Unspecified 
Lead 
analyst 
Lead analyst All analysts 
 54 
 
Appendix 3: Analytical key factors of sovereign rating assignments 
           Agency CI 
 
Cyprus 
(Kuwait) 
Dagong 
 
China 
 
DBRS 
 
Canada 
 
Feri 
 
Germany 
 
Fitch 
 
USA 
(France) 
JCR 
 
Japan 
 
Moody’s 
 
USA 
 
R&I 
 
Japan 
 
S&P 
 
USA 
 Indicators 
Domestic 
economic 
performance 
­ Economic 
growth prospects 
­ Economic 
strength 
­ Economic 
structure 
­ Total GDP 
­ Historical growth 
and prospects 
­ Inflation 
­ Demographics 
and social 
structure 
­ Economic 
growth 
­ Price 
stability 
­ Demographic, 
educational and 
structural factors 
­ Labor market 
analysis 
­ Structure of output 
and trade 
­ Dynamism of the 
private sector 
­ Balance of supply 
and demand 
­ Industrial structure 
­ Fundamentals of 
economic 
development 
­ Growth potential 
­ Economic 
achievements 
­ GDP per capita 
­ Diversification 
and size 
­ Long­term 
trends 
­ Economic 
fundamentals 
­ Growth 
­ Economic 
structure and 
growth prospects 
Political and 
institutional 
performance 
­ Level of political 
risk 
­ Political risks 
­ Institutional 
strength 
­ Political 
environment 
­ Government 
policy 
management 
­ Rule of law 
­ Economic 
freedom 
­ Political 
condition 
­ Foreign investment 
policy 
­ Policies and the state 
­ Macroeconomic 
policy 
­ Political and social 
stability 
­ Policy effectiveness 
and recognition 
­ State of governance 
­ Rule of law 
­ Governance 
­ Transparency 
­ Regulatory 
developments 
­ Socio­political 
fundamentals 
­ Policy 
management 
capacity 
­ Institutional 
effectiveness 
­ Political risks 
Financial stability 
and fiscal 
performance 
­ Sustainability of 
public finances 
­ Financial risks 
­ Governments debt 
repayment 
capability 
­ Banking system  
­ Expenditure 
­ Revenues 
­ Fiscal balance 
­ Budget planning 
­ Monetary policy 
­ Financial system 
stability 
­ Public 
finance 
­ Capital 
market 
structure 
­ Banking and finance 
­ Analysis of medium­
term growth 
constraints 
­ Trends in the fiscal 
balance 
­ Financial system 
­ Framework of 
financial regulations 
and supervision 
­ Government 
balance sheet 
­ Fiscal 
conditions 
­ Funding 
structure 
­ Fiscal 
performance and 
flexibility 
­ Debt burden 
­ Monetary 
flexibility 
External 
performance 
­ Country’s 
external growth 
position 
­ International 
reserves 
­ External debt 
­ Short­term foreign 
debt 
­ Currency reserve 
system 
­ International 
economic 
integration 
­ External debt & 
liquidity 
­ Net external 
position 
­ Current 
account 
­ Capital 
account 
­ External assets 
­ External liabilities 
­ International position 
­ Balance of payments 
­ External debt 
structure 
­ Trends in balance of 
payments 
­ Management of 
foreign exchange 
reserves 
­ Financial risk 
(external debts) 
­ Susceptibility to 
external risk  
­ Balance of 
payments 
 ­ External liquidity 
­ International 
investment 
position 
Sources: Personal communication with Moody’s Client Services (28 February 2013, 4 March 2013, 22 March 2013, 25 March 2013), Feri EuroRating Services AG (14 March 2013, 21 March 2013), 
Dagong Global Credit Rating (5 April 2013, 3 June 2013), and internet research (see Online Appendix A2 for detailed list of sources) 
 
